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We document that the percentage of all U.S. assets that are “safe” has remained stable at about 33
percent since 1952. This stable ratio is a rare example of calm in a rapidly changing financial world.
Over the same time period, the ratio of U.S. assets to GDP has increased by a factor of 2.5, and the
main supplier of safe financial debt has shifted from commercial banks to the “shadow banking system.”
We analyze this pattern of stylized facts and offer some tentative conclusions about the composition
of the safe-asset share and its role within the overall economy.
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Over  the  past  sixty  years,  the  total  amount  of  assets  in  the  United  States  economy  has 
exploded, growing from approximately four times GDP in 1952 to more than ten times GDP at 
the  end  of  2010.  Yet  within  this  rapid  increase  in  total  assets  lies  a  remarkable  fact:  the 
percentage  of  all  assets  that  can  be  considered  “safe”  has  remained  very  stable  over  time. 
Specifically, the percentage of all assets represented by the sum of U.S. government debt and by 
the safe component of private financial debt, which we call the “safe-asset share”, has remained 
close to 33 percent in every year since 1952.  In this paper, we document the stability of the safe-
asset  share,  analyze  its  composition  and  dynamics,  and  briefly  examine  some  of  the  policy 
implications of our results.  
The  dynamics  of  the  safe-asset  share  are  important  for  economists,  policymakers,  and 
regulators to understand because “safe” debt plays a major role in facilitating trade. Gary Gorton 
and  George  Pennacchi  (1990)  argue  that  the  main  purpose  of  financial  intermediaries  is  to 
produce “safe” debt, with bank deposits as the quintessential example.  Most financial-sector 
debt has the primary feature that it is information-insensitive, that is, it is immune to adverse 
selection  in  trading  because  agents  have  no  desire  to  acquire  private  information  about  the 
current health of the issuer (see Tri Vi Dang, Gorton, and Bengt Holmström (2010)). Treasuries, 
Agencies, and other forms of highly-rated government debt also have this feature.  To the extent 
that  debt  is  information-insensitive,  it  can  be  used  efficiently  as  collateral  in  financial 
transactions,  a  role  in  finance  that  is  analogous  to  the  role  of  money  in  commerce.  Thus, 
information-insensitive or “safe” debt is socially valuable.  Importantly, the stability of the safe-
asset share implies that the demand for information-insensitive debt has been relatively constant 
as a fraction of the total assets in the economy.  Given the rapid amount of change within the 
economy over the past sixty  years, the  relatively constant demand for safe debt  suggests an 2 
 
underlying transactions technology that is not well understood.  Thus, we view this paper as part 
of a larger research agenda aimed at understanding the role of financial-sector debt within the 
economy. 
While the safe-asset share has remained constant, the components of the safe-asset share 
have changed dramatically over time.  Historically, Treasuries and bank deposits constituted the 
vast majority of safe debt.  Over the past thirty years, however, an entirely new segment of the 
financial sector known as the “shadow banking sector” has emerged which produces a material 
fraction of the safe debt in the economy.  The shadow banking sector has largely escaped (and 
continues to escape) the attention of regulators and policymakers, much to the chagrin of many 
participants  in  the  economy.  However,  the  constancy  of  the  safe  asset  share  implies  that 
regulators and policymakers should tread carefully when considering any new regulations or 
legislation that would potentially limit the production function of the financial sector.  If the 
demand for information-insensitive debt is constant, attempts to regulate the shadow banking 
sector too onerously may simply push the creation of safe debt to other sectors of the economy, 
where  it  would  (presumably)  be  produced  less  efficiently.  Likewise,  attempts  to  impose 
additional regulation on the traditional banking sector may  backfire by pushing more of the 
production of safe debt into the shadow banking sector.  In short, regulators and policymakers 
must  adroitly  balance  the  need  to  improve  financial  stability  with  the  simultaneous  need  to 
maintain enough  liquid,  safe debt  in  the economy  to  meet  the demand for such debt.   This 
requires a better understanding of the drivers of the demand for safe debt, which we believe 
should be an important area of research interest in future years. 
   3 
 
I.  The Growth of Assets 
Moritz Schularick and Alan Taylor (2012) gathered data on the banking-sector assets of 14 
major economies since 1870. They found that the ratio of such assets to GDP was relatively 
stable until World War 2, but subsequently rose sharply.  They label this post-war period the 
“second  financial  era”,  and  contrast  this  increasing  ratio  with  the  relatively  stable  long-run 
relationship between money and GDP throughout the entire period.  Data availability constraints 
restricted Schularick and Taylor (2012) to focus on the commercial banking sector.  However, 
data availability in the United States allows for broader coverage of the entire financial sector.  
Figure 1 plots the growth of overall assets, financial-sector assets, and equity as a ratio of GDP. 
The data show that overall assets rise from about four times GDP in 1952 to ten times GDP in 
2010.  Financial-sector assets represented a large part of this overall growth, rising from about 
one times GDP in 1952 to more than four times GDP in 2010.  In total, the assets of the financial 
sector have risen from about 25 percent of the assets in the economy in 1952 to about 40 percent 
of the assets in the economy by the end of 2010.  Thus, assets in the economy have grown 
rapidly over the past 60 years, with much of this increase coming from the financial sector. 
Interestingly,  Figure  1  also  shows  that  the  (equity)  capital  to  GDP  ratio  has  remained 
relatively constant over the past 60 years, consistent with the stylized fact first popularized by 
Nicholas Kaldor (1957).  This suggests that most of the growth in assets over the past 60 years 
has been financed through debt rather than equity.  In other words, Figure 1 shows that while the 
efficiency in which the economy converts capital into output has remained constant, the amount 
of capital needed to produce a dollar of assets has fallen considerably over the past sixty years.  
Thus, the growth of assets has been primarily fueled by higher leverage in the economy.   
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Figure 1: The Asset-GDP Ratio 
 
Source:  Federal Reserve Flow of Funds 
II.  The Stability of the Safe-Asset Share 
While the assets of the financial sector and the economy as a whole have rapidly grown, the 
fraction of “safe” assets in the economy has remained relatively constant.  In this section, we 
document the stability of the safe-asset share. Our definition of “safe” assets includes assets that 
are either directly or indirectly used in an information-insensitive fashion, i.e. as money.  The 
key  components  of  “safe”  debt  include  bank  deposits,  money  market  mutual  fund  shares, 
commercial paper, federal funds and repurchase agreements (“repo”), short-term interbank loans, 
Treasuries,  agency  debt,  municipal  bonds,  securitized  debt,  and  high-grade  financial-sector 
corporate  debt.    The  latter  five  categories  of  debt  are  commonly  used  as  collateral  in  repo 
transactions and the asset-backed commercial paper market, and prior to the financial crisis, repo 
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deposited as collateral.  Hence, at least until the crisis, these assets were information-insensitive 
(Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick (2012)).  From the list above, it is clear that most forms of 
safe debt are issued by the government and the financial sector.  While an argument can be made 
that certain types of non-financial corporate debt are “safe” according to the definition above, the 
size of the market for this debt is very small relative to the size of the other markets in question.  
Thus, we restrict our attention to safe, information-insensitive debt issued by the government and 
the financial sector. 
We compute the fraction of safe debt in the economy using data from the Federal Reserve’s 
Flow of Funds database.  We begin by examining the total liabilities of the government and the 
financial sector, as well as the total liabilities and equity in all sectors (which approximates total 
assets).  We then make a number of adjustments to arrive at a calculation for the amount of safe 
debt in the economy.  First, we remove U.S. government securities held by federal retirement 
programs and loans from the federal government to states from both government liabilities and 
total assets, since these essentially represent intra-governmental loans.  We also move non-MBS 
agency debt from the financial liabilities category into the government liabilities category, since 
“plain” agency debt is effectively no different than Treasuries.  Next, we remove taxes payable, 
mortgages taken out by REITs, mutual fund shares, life insurance reserves, and pension fund 
reserves from the Fed’s computation of financial liabilities, as these liabilities do not represent 
information-insensitive security offerings by financial-sector participants.  We also assume that 
only 85% of MBS, ABS, and other forms of long-term debt issued by the financial sector are 
considered information-insensitive, and therefore safe enough to use in financial transactions.  
Likewise, we remove life insurance reserves and retiree health care funds from the computation 
of “safe” government liabilities, as these liabilities are not information-insensitive.  After making 6 
 
the adjustments listed above, we then compute a “high” and “low” estimate of the amount of safe 
debt in the economy.  Our high estimate of safe debt encompasses all remaining government and 
financial-sector liabilities, which are largely comprised of Treasuries, municipal bonds, short-
term and long-term corporate debt, securitized debt, and other miscellaneous liabilities.  Our low 
estimate  excludes  miscellaneous  financial  liabilities,  loans,  a  number  of  accounts  involving 
payables, and other liabilities that are not routinely traded.  The Appendix posted on the AER 
web site provides more detail on what items are included in both of our scenarios.   
Figure 2:  The Safe-Asset Share (High Estimate) 
 
Source:  Federal Reserve Flow of Funds  
Figure 2 shows that in the post-war period, the fraction of total “safe” liabilities to total assets 
in the economy hovers in a tight band between approximately 30-35%.  Thus, to the extent that 
the demand for information-insensitive securities equates with supply, the figure suggests that 
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wish to stress that a number of the components of safe debt in Figure 2 are likely measured with 
error.  Hence,  until  better  data  becomes  available,  our  results  should  be  mostly  viewed  as 
suggestive. 
To examine the demand for safe debt more closely, we regress the ratio of (Financial + 
Government Liabilities)/Total Assets against a time trend using quarterly data from 1952-2011.  
Panel A of Table 1 shows that the ratio of financial and government liabilities to total assets has 
remained fairly constant over the past 60 years at around 33% under our high estimate of safe 
debt and 31% under our low estimate of safe debt.  While the time trend variable in Table 1 is 
statistically  significant,  its  economic  significance  is  marginal:  over  239  quarters,  the  total 
predicted decrease in the ratio is only 1.5% under the high estimate and 5% under the low 
estimate.  Figure 2 also suggests that government debt and bank debt may be substitutes; as 
government debt decreases as a fraction of total assets, debt issued by financial intermediaries 
tends to increase, and vice versa.  To examine this possibility in more detail, we regress the 
fraction  of  private  financial  liabilities  in  the  economy  against  the  fraction  of  government 
liabilities in the economy.  Consistent with the view that financial liabilities and government 
liabilities are substitutes, Panel B of Table 1 shows that the coefficients on government liabilities 
are strongly negative.   
These results suggest that financial liabilities and government liabilities may be substitutes.  
However, since both financial and government liabilities appear in the denominator on both 
sides, it may be possible to obtain the results in Panel B through a mechanical relationship.  To 
analyze this possibility, we simulated 10,000 regressions identical to the regressions in Table 1 
for our high estimate of safe debt using Monte Carlo methods.  Specifically, for each of the 
10,000 iterations, we constructed eight new time series (there are eight major series in the Fed 8 
 
data) by growing each series’ initial value based on random shocks that were drawn from a 
normal distribution using the mean and standard deviation of the series’ growth rate over our 
sample period.  We then computed the variables shown in Table 1 from our simulated data and 
estimated the regressions reported in Table 1. 
Table 1: The Safe-Asset Share and the Substitutability of Government and Financial Debt 
  Dependent Variable  Independent Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  R
2 
Panel A. The Safe-Asset Share           
High Estimate  Safe Assets / Total Assets  Constant  0.332    0.003    
0.00002   




    Time Trend  -0.00004    0.00002     -1.72   
Low Estimate  Safe Assets / Total Assets  Constant  0.310    0.003     122.73  0.367 
    Time Trend  -0.00021    0.00002    -11.71   
         
Panel B. The Substitutability of Government and Financial Debt         
High Estimate   Financial-sector Liabilities /   Constant  0.267  0.006     48.17  0.286 
  Total Assets  Government Liabilities /  -0.466  0.048     -9.74   
    Total Assets           
Low Estimate  Financial-sector Liabilities /   Constant  0.195    0.004     55.44  0.105 
  Total Assets  Government Liabilities /  -0.168    0.032     -5.28   
    Total Assets         
Notes: See text for variable definitions.  The sample period spans 239 quarters from Q1 1952 to Q3 2011.   
Sources: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds; Author calculations. 
 
If the coefficients in Table 1 were the result of a mechanical relationship, we would expect 
the coefficients in Table 1 to lie roughly in the middle of our simulated coefficients.  However, 
fewer  than  7%  of  our  10,000  simulated  regressions  from  Panel  A  produced  point  estimates 
smaller than our reported coefficient.  Thus, the simulations suggest that the constancy of the 
safe-asset share is not simply an artifact of the ratio computations.  In contrast, approximately 
30% of our simulated regressions produced point estimates smaller than the coefficient reported 
in Panel B of our table, leaving some combination of chance and the mechanical relationship as a 
possible explanation for our results in Panel B.  However, additional evidence in support of the 
substitutability  of  financial  and  government  debt  is  provided  by  Arvind  Krishnamurthy  and 
Annette Vissing-Jorgensen (2010), who find, for example, that the spread between second-tier 
commercial paper and first-tier commercial paper falls when the supply of Treasuries expands, 
suggesting that top-tier  commercial paper is  a  substitute for Treasuries.    Robin  Greenwood, 9 
 
Samuel G. Hanson and Jeremy C. Stein (2010) also provide evidence that short-term financial-
sector debt and government debt are substitutes.  Neither of these papers examines longer-term 
financial-sector obligations that may be used as collateral for repo or other forms of short-term 
debt.  Hence, to our knowledge, our findings on safe debt are novel. 
III.  Safe Financial-Sector Debt: A Closer Look 
The classic form of safe financial debt is bank deposits. But while bank deposits comprised 
the vast majority of safe financial debt before 1980, the share of deposits has dropped by more 
than one half from its peak.  Figure 3 plots the details.  In the figure, “money-like debt” refers to 
commercial paper, net repurchase agreements, federal funds, money market mutual fund assets, 
interbank transactions, broker-dealer payables, and broker-dealer security credits.  More details 
are provided in the Appendix. 
The figure shows that bank deposits were near 80 percent of the total through the 1950s and 
1960s, and remained as high as 70 percent as late as 1978.  This percentage then began a steep 
30-year decline, with the rise of money market mutual funds, broker-deal commercial paper, 
securitized debt from GSEs, and other asset-backed securities.   On the eve of the financial crisis, 
the share of bank deposits had fallen to 27 percent.  At the end of 2010, it stood at a little less 







Figure 3 – The Components of Safe Financial Debt  
 
Source:  Federal Reserve Flow of Funds 
Taken together, Figures 1, 2, and 3 provide a picture of calm stability (Figure 2) amidst rapid 
change (Figures 1 and 3).  While the financial system has  grown rapidly relative to overall 
economic activity, the system itself seems anchored to a constant share of safe, information-
insensitive debt.  At the same time, a variety of changes in the financial sector has moved the 
production of this debt from their traditional source in bank deposits to newer sources in the 
shadow banking sector.   
IV.  Discussion 
The recent financial crisis dramatically revealed that the U.S. financial system has changed 
significantly over the last sixty years. The traditional concepts of a “bank” and of “money” are 
no longer adequate to describe the world in which we live.  In the past thirty years, the shadow 
banking system has grown enormously.  Furthermore, the ratio of total assets to GDP has grown 
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remained constant.  This constancy is not by chance and suggests an underlying transactions 
technology.  The production of total assets appears to require safe debt as an input.  Little is 
known about this transactions technology. 
Figure 2 suggests that the demand for safe or information-insensitive debt exceeds the supply 
of U.S. Treasuries outstanding.  The private sector can produce substitutes for government debt 
in the form of short-term instruments or long-term debt securities that can be used as collateral or 
as  safe  stores  of  value.    Consistent  with  the  rise  of  the  shadow  banking  system,  the  main 
producers of safe debt are not commercial banks, whose share of private safe debt has been 
shrinking. Of course, the government could attempt to completely satiate the demand for safe 
debt by issuing more Treasuries.  In such a world, there would be no need for “safe” private 
financial-sector debt outside of banking deposits.  However, recent developments in sovereign 
debt  markets  suggest  that  even  governments  cannot  issue  too  much  debt  without  such  debt 
becoming information-sensitive.  Thus, if the demand for safe assets cannot be met in whole by 
the  government,  near-riskless  debt  issued  by  the  financial  sector  plays  an  important  role  in 
facilitating trade.  This makes the “safe” debt provided by the financial sector socially valuable.   
These findings are important for banking regulatory policy.  The traditional banking system 
is no longer the central actor in the production of safe debt.  Small policy changes with regard to 
this sector may well drive activity further into the shadow banking sector.  Furthermore, since 
the demand for safe assets is roughly constant, attempts to squelch the shadow banking sector 
would simply push the production of safe debt into another, less efficient sector.   
A more striking conclusion is that despite the size and importance of the financial system, we 
currently know very little about the demand for and supply of “safe” debt.  While we hope that 
our work is a start in the right direction, our paper raises a number of important questions.  Why 12 
 
is the safe-asset share constant?  Did the demand for safe assets play a role in the rise of the 
shadow banking system?  What is the underlying transactions technology that relates the safe-
asset share to the rest of the economy?  We hope that these and other questions regarding safe 
debt will be addressed through future research. 






Line item Identifier High estimate Low estimate
FINANCIAL LIABILITIES
Financial business; total liabilities  FL794190005.Q
can be broken down as follows:
Financial business; net interbank transactions; liability FL794110005.Q Y Y
Financial business; checkable deposits and currency; liability FL793120005.Q Y Y
Financial business; total time and savings deposits; liability FL793130005.Q Y Y
Money market mutual funds; total financial assets FL634090005.Q Y Y
Financial business; federal funds and security repurchase agreements; liability FL792150005.Q Y Y
Security brokers and dealers; trade payables; liability FL663170003.Q Y N
Security brokers and dealers; security credit; liability FL663167005.Q Y N
Financial business; credit market instruments; liability FL794104005.Q
   Financial business; open market paper; liability FL793169100.Q
      U.S.-chartered commercial banks; asset-backed commercial paper; liability FL723169103.Q Y Y
      Bank holding companies; commercial paper; liability FL733169103.Q Y Y
      Issuers of asset-backed securities; commercial paper, excluding U.S.-chartered 
commercial banks' asset-backed commercial paper; liability FL673169105.Q Y Y
      Finance companies; commercial paper; liability FL613169100.Q Y Y
      Real estate investment trusts; commercial paper; liability FL643169103.Q Y Y
      Funding corporations; commercial paper; liability  FL503169105.Q Y Y
      Private depository institutions and money market mutual funds excluding bank 
holding companies; bankers' acceptances; liability FL783169605.Q Y Y
   Government-sponsored enterprises and federally related mortgage pools; U.S. 
government agency securities; liability FL423161705.Q
      Government-sponsored enterprises; other GSE issues; liability FL403161785.Q 85% 85%
      Government-sponsored enterprises; securitized GSE issues; liability FL403161795.Q 85% 85%
      Agency-and GSE-backed mortgage pools; total mortgages; asset FL413065005.Q 85% 85%
   Financial business; corporate and foreign bonds; liability FL793163005.Q
      U.S.-chartered commercial banks; corporate and foreign bonds; liability FL723163003.Q 85% 85%
      Bank holding companies; corporate and foreign bonds; liability FL733163003.Q 85% 85%
      Savings institutions OTS reporters; corporate and foreign bonds; liability FL443163053.Q 85% 85%
      Issuers of asset-backed securities; corporate and foreign bonds; liability FL673163005.Q 85% 85%
      Finance companies; corporate and foreign bonds; liability FL613163003.Q 85% 85%
      Real estate investment trusts; corporate and foreign bonds; liability FL643163003.Q 85% 85%
      Security brokers and dealers; corporate and foreign bonds; liability FL663163003.Q 85% 85%
      Funding corporations; corporate and foreign bonds where the proceeds are down-
streamed to broker-dealer subsidiaries by investment banks that are holding-company 
parents; liability FL503163005.Q 85% 85%
   Private nonbank financial institutions; bank loans not elsewhere classified; liability FL693168005.Q 85% N
   Financial business; other loans and advances; liability FL793169005.Q 85% N
   Real estate investment trusts; total mortgages; liability FL643165005.Q N N
Mutual funds; mutual fund shares; liability FL653164205.Q N N
Life insurance companies; life insurance reserves; liability FL543140003.Q N N
Households and nonprofit organizations; pension fund reserves; asset FL153050005.Q N N
Financial business; taxes payable; liability FL793178005.Q N N
Financial business; total miscellaneous liabilities FL793190005.Q Y N
Included in "safe" category?14 
 
 
Definitions:  Y = Included; N = Not included; 85% = Since not all financial debt is “safe,” only 85% of 
the total amount was included in the “safe” category; X = Removed from calculation completely. 
 
Other notes:   
1)  In both scenarios, “Government-sponsored enterprises; other GSE issues; liability” was moved from 
Financial to Government liabilities. 
2)  In Figure 3, “MBS/ABS Debt” includes all GSE and private-label MBS debt, as well as all ABS debt.  
“Corporate Bonds and Loans” includes "Financial business; corporate and foreign bonds; liability", 
"Private nonbank financial institutions; bank loans not elsewhere classified; liability", and "Financial 
business; other loans and advances; liability." 
3)  Series labeled with the term “asset” above represent series in which assets = liabilities.  Hence, we are 
actually measuring liabilities.  This accounting mechanism comes directly from the Flow of Funds.   
Flow of Funds
Line item Identifier High estimate Low estimate
GOVERNMENT LIABILITIES
Federal government; total liabilities FL314190005.Q
can be broken down as follows:
Federal government; special drawing rights (SDRs) allocations; liability FL313111303.Q Y Y
Monetary authority; SDR certificates issued by federal government; asset FL713014003.Q Y Y
Federal government; Treasury currency; liability FL313112003.Q Y Y
Federal government; credit market instruments; liability FL314104005.Q
   Federal government; U.S. savings bonds; liability FL313161400.Q Y Y
   Federal government; Treasury securities, excluding U.S. savings bonds, and including 
special U.S. Treasury securities held by FHLB; liability FL313161105.Q Y Y
   Federal government; budget agency securities; liability FL313161705.Q Y Y
   Federal government; multifamily residential mortgages; liability FL313165403.Q Y Y
Federal government; trade payables; liability FL313170005.Q Y N
Federal government; life insurance reserves; liability FL313140003.Q N N
Federal government; total miscellaneous liabilities, including nonmarketable government 
securities held by federal government retirement funds FL313190005.Q
   Federal government retirement funds; nonmarketable Treasury securities; asset FL343150005.Q X X
   Federal government; total miscellaneous liabilities, excluding nonmarketable 
securities held by federal government retirement funds FL313190015.Q
      Federal government; liability due to FICO FL313193013.Q Y N
      Federal government; postal savings system deposits; liability FL313131003.Q Y Y
      Federal government; retiree health care funds; liability FL313195105.Q N N
State and local governments, excluding employee retirement funds; total liabilities FL214190005.Q
can be broken down as follows:
State and local governments, excluding employee retirement funds; credit market 
instruments; liability FL214104005.Q
   State and local governments, excluding employee retirement funds; municipal 
securities and loans; liability FL213162005.Q Y Y
      State and local governments, excluding employee retirement funds; short-term 
municipal securities and loans; liability FL213162400.Q Y Y
      State and local governments, excluding employee retirement funds; long-term 
municipal securities and loans; liability FL213162205.Q Y Y
   State and local governments, excluding employee retirement funds; U.S. government 
loans; liability FL213169203.Q X X
State and local governments, excluding employee retirement funds; trade payables; 
liability FL213170003.Q Y N
Included in "safe" category?15 
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